University of Rhode Island

DigitalCommons@URI
Environmental and Natural Resource
Economics Faculty Publications

Environmental and Natural Resource
Economics

5-2012

Targeting maps: An asset-based approach to geographic
targeting
Corey Lang
University of Rhode Island, clang@uri.edu

Christopher B. Barrett
Felix Naschold

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uri.edu/enre_facpubs
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons

Terms of Use
All rights reserved under copyright.
Citation/Publisher Attribution
Lang, C., Barrett, C. B., & Naschold, F. (2013). Targeting Maps: An Asset-Based Approach to Geographic
Targeting. World Development, 41, 232-244.
Available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2012.06.006

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Environmental and Natural Resource Economics at
DigitalCommons@URI. It has been accepted for inclusion in Environmental and Natural Resource Economics
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@URI. For more information, please contact
digitalcommons@etal.uri.edu.

Targeting maps:
An asset-based approach to geographic targeting*
Corey Lang, Christopher B. Barrett and Felix Naschold
May 2012 revised version
Abstract
Proper targeting of policy interventions requires reasonable estimates of the benefits of
the alternative options. To inform such decisions, we develop an integrated approach
stemming from the small-area estimation literature that estimates the marginal returns
to a range of assets across geographically defined subpopulations. We create a series of
maps that can be overlaid with traditional poverty maps to identify strong candidate
areas for intervention, though an efficiency/equity tradeoff sometimes exists. We apply
our method using recent Ugandan data. Results are consistent with independent
empirical findings and suggest asset specific transfer schemes would improve with a
spatially targeted strategy.

JEL classification: R12, O2, C15, I32
Keywords: geographic targeting, assets, poverty maps, spatial variation, Uganda

*

We appreciate helpful discussions with Nancy Johnson, GIS data assistance from John Owuor and Ugandan data
advice from Thomas Emwanu. Useful comments were received from seminar participants at Cornell University, the
International Food Policy Research Institute, the International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) and the World
Bank and two anonymous referees. Financial support was provided by ILRI and the National Science Foundation
Expeditions grant in computational sustainability (number 0832782). Any remaining errors are the authors’ sole
responsibility. Email addresses: clang@mail.uri.edu (Lang), cbb2@cornell.edu (Barrett), fn23@cornell.edu
(Naschold).
1

1. Introduction
Improved targeting of development interventions has long been recognized as central to
increasing the impact from poverty reduction efforts. However, effective targeting requires
reasonable estimates not just of who or where the poor are, but also of where the returns to
various programs are likely to be highest. Put differently, targeting concerns “what” and “where”
questions every bit as much as the more familiar “who” questions. No means currently exist,
however, for estimating and comparing expected benefits across space and across alternative
interventions, much less of linking such estimates to the spatial distribution of poverty. In this
paper, we develop a method that, first, estimates the marginal returns to a range of assets,
allowing returns to vary by household and by geography and, second, maps the estimated
marginal returns to the various assets, creating a visual tool that can inform the targeting
decisions of an asset transfer scheme.
This paper’s motivational and methodological starting point is poverty mapping. Elbers et
al. (2003) pioneered a technique that combines detailed, nationally representative household
survey data with national census data to estimate poverty rates at fine levels of disaggregation for
an entire country. Once estimated, the poverty rates for the different regions of a country can be
used to create a poverty map, a visual representation of the spatial distribution of poverty. 1 This
simple tool is popular and widely used by governments, NGOs and donors in low-income
countries to guide poverty reduction efforts. 2
Although poverty maps can facilitate policy discussions, they offer no explicit
recommendation as to the best means of alleviating poverty. If a government is trying to reach a
specific welfare target such as the Millennium Development Goals, poverty maps can at best
guide the government to regions with high poverty rates. They do not, however, inform the
critical subsequent choice of what exactly the government should do in that region.
Targeting maps address this crucial shortcoming of poverty maps by answering two
general questions: 1) for a given region, which asset building activity will have the largest
marginal gross benefit? and 2) for a given type of asset building activity, in which regions are the
1

The resulting poverty estimates have also been used to investigate the causes of poverty (Kam et al. 2005, Okwi et
al. 2007) or its consequences (Demombynes and Ozler 2005).
2
Tarozzi and Deaton (2009) and Elbers et al. (2008) evaluate the validity of poverty mapping methods using census
data that include income measures. Tarozzi and Deaton argue that useful information is contained in the poverty
estimates, but standard errors are too small and assumptions spatial homogeneity are too strong. We partially
address the spatial homogeneity concern by including location-specific interaction terms in our model.
2

marginal gross benefits largest? Good answers to either or both of these questions can improve
the efficacy of targeted, asset-based development programs. Answers to the first question are
paramount for those wishing to cut poverty by the most efficient means possible. The second
question appeals to groups interested in investments of a specific type, such as Heifer
International in building livestock holdings or The Nature Conservancy in safeguarding natural
resources. With scarce resources available to finance transfers, targeting maps can help identify
where poverty reduction efforts are likely to generate the most bang-for-the-buck.
This approach takes as given the desirability of geographic targeting. The idea of
geographic targeting is to determine a subset of geographic regions most in need and then
transfer benefits first (or only) to individuals within the chosen regions. While there are several
methods of targeting aid, such as a proxy-means tested targeting, community-based targeting,
categorical or indicator targeting and self-targeting, the empirical evidence suggests that
geographic targeting is particularly effective for poverty alleviation (Coady et al. 2004, Baker
and Grosh 1994) and is easier and less expensive to monitor and administer than other methods
(Bigman and Fofack 2000).
The major disadvantages to geographic targeting are that non-poor individuals living in
targeted regions receive benefits (leakage) and poor individuals not living in targeted regions do
not receive benefits (undercoverage). One remedy that is routinely applied is to combine
geographic targeting with additional targeting tools to limit leakage. Coady et al. (2004) survey
122 targeted transfer programs and find the mean number of targeting tools used is more than
two; for example, Mexico’s celebrated PROGRESA/Opportunidades program uses four (Coady
2006). A second solution is to target more finely partitioned regions. As regions become
increasingly disaggregated, within region heterogeneity decreases and targeting performance
increases (Elbers et al. 2007, Baker and Grosh 1994).
In this paper, we build on the proven successes of geographic targeting and propose an
enhanced, asset-based approach. We explore the possibility of transfers from an entire range of
private and public assets, such as livestock, mobile phones, means of transportation, and access
to roads or microfinance institutions. Our focus on assets stems from the importance of a
household’s asset portfolio in determining the nature, extent and persistence of poverty and
vulnerability (Moser 1998, Ellis and Freeman 2004, Adato et al. 2006). Further, if and where
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poverty traps exist, asset transfers may push households beyond an asset poverty threshold and
allow them to engineer their own escape from income poverty (Carter and Barrett 2006).
While in-kind transfers can appear paternalistic, as they constrain household choice in
ways that cash transfers do not, there are several reasons why an asset-based approach could
perform better than a monetary approach. 3 First, imperfect markets can make it difficult for
households to procure desired assets; this is a common rationale for in-kind food or seed aid in
many remote or disaster-affected regions. Second, in-kind transfers may stick to the targeted
households better than cash because of the well-established endowment effects associated with
physical goods but not with cash. For example, the findings of Hoffmann et al. (2009) suggest
that in-kind transfers of mosquito nets would result in greater use of the nets than would
equivalent cash transfers. Third, some assets – especially public goods such as paved roads – are
not readily available for private purchase. Fourth, in-kind transfers often enjoy greater political
support than do monetary transfers. Further, monetary transfers, due to their ready divisibility,
may also be subject to a high rate of social taxation compared to a lumpy asset, perhaps undoing
efforts to control leakage. And in practical terms, governments and charitable organizations
routinely make in-kind transfers so improving the efficacy of such interventions is desirable even
if one believes cash transfers generally preferable.
The targeting maps tool introduced in this paper improves the information set guiding
geographic targeting of in-kind transfers. Given substantial spatial heterogeneity in poverty
incidence and its causes (Emwanu et al. 2007, Okwi et al. 2007, Kam et al. 2005), there is little
reason to believe that any single transfer form is best suited for all places in a country. Likewise,
asset valuation is inevitably spatially heterogeneous, given the place-specificity of many
complementary inputs – e.g., agro-ecological conditions that affect livestock value, economic
activity that affects the returns to transportation infrastructure. If poverty and the returns to assets
both vary markedly across space for a variety of geographic, institutional, policy and
technological reasons, then it is desirable to exploit the predictable component of such variation
in targeting asset-based development interventions. Previous research has found considerable
intra-regional variation in expected returns to different development investments, such as high
yielding seed varieties and roads, in Africa and Asia (Fan and Chan-Kang 2004). By customizing

3

Currie and Gahvari (2008) review the debate over monetary versus in-kind transfers, though mainly from the
perspective of developed countries.
4

asset-based interventions to specific geographic areas, significant gains could be made in costeffectively addressing poverty. Our approach integrates spatially-explicit estimation of the
marginal benefits to multiple assets into a single framework such that inter-asset comparisons of
expected marginal benefits can be made for each region and linked to spatially-explicit poverty
estimates.
While poverty maps offer a ranking of areas based on need, targeting maps rank areas in
terms of the size of marginal benefits. This presents the possibility that high returns may not
correspond to need, and thus a tradeoff between equity and efficiency is necessary. However,
this tradeoff is present regardless of whether or not targeting maps are used. Targeting maps help
to quantify the tradeoff, but also highlight synergies between equity and efficiency. In this paper,
we do not judge which targeting schemes are best, we merely provide flexible empirical tools
that can help inform the process with the preferences of the policy maker guiding the process.
Ultimately, we envision the targeting maps output being used as one of several components,
including poverty maps and local knowledge, informing a targeted asset transfer plan. 4
The method of creating targeting maps, detailed in Section 2, involves several distinct
steps similar to those involved in creating a poverty map. Using detailed household survey data
and spatially explicit environmental and infrastructure data, we apply multivariate regression and
bootstrapping techniques to estimate the returns to various assets and to determine how the
estimated returns vary across space. We then project the parameter estimates onto the broader
national census data and calculate the marginal returns as a function of projected estimates and
current household asset holdings, while simultaneously estimating household-specific poverty
status, this latter output very similar to conventional poverty mapping. Finally, we aggregate the
estimated marginal returns across households for small geographic areas and, using Geographic
Information Systems (GIS), generate maps of both the magnitude and scope of estimated benefits
as well as a poverty map.
In Section 2, we also discuss limitations of the methodology, largely centered around
issues of endogeneity. Our estimation strategy necessarily ignores bidirectional causality
between assets and welfare and unobserved household heterogeneity, both of which could bias
estimates. This is a serious concern, but one that is unfortunately unavoidable in any analysis that

4

Local knowledge could include customs, norms, local government, supplier behavior, corruption within
government, etc.
5

tries to answer the questions posed above. There is no feasible way to estimate marginal returns
to many assets across a large geographical space with ironclad identification. We submit that an
explicit, albeit clearly imperfect decision tool is better than none at all and thus that targeting
maps deliver useful information that can improve the efficacy of development interventions.
While it is impossible to argue a purely causal relationship, understanding how households’ asset
portfolios and local environment covary with their welfare can nonetheless provide useful
insights to inform development interventions. Given the considerable policy and operational
importance of the questions targeting maps address, this tradeoff is attractive. Perhaps future
research can ameliorate this shortcoming.
We illustrate our approach using Ugandan household survey and census data. The data
are discussed in Section 3. The results, discussed in Section 4, are encouraging; estimated and
projected marginal benefits to asset transfers seem reasonable and show remarkable variation
across space. Our results identify promising areas to target as well as indicate key assets to use in
a geographic targeting scheme. Further, our results are consistent with recent Uganda-specific
research regarding transportation infrastructure (Lall et al. 2009, Raballand et al. 2009). Our
findings reinforce the value of geographic targeting and the importance of spatial analysis.

2. Method
We estimate average expected marginal household-level benefits to various assets across
geographically defined subpopulations. In the context of this paper, assets are taken as anything
whose stock can affect a household’s welfare. 5 We classify assets along two dimensions: private
vs. public and targetable vs. non-targetable. Private and public goods follow standard definitions;
public goods are non-rival and non-excludable and private goods constitute the rest. We
delineate targetable from non-targetable assets based on whether an asset’s quantity, quality or
existence can be changed by an intervention. This classification results in four categories: private
targetable assets (e.g., livestock holdings, literacy, land holdings), public targetable assets (e.g.,
source of potable drinking water, access to health clinics, road access), private non-targetable
assets (e.g., education level of household head, gender of household head) and public non-

5

For now, we remain general about the measurement of welfare, although we use expenditure data to illustrate our
method.
6

targetable assets (e.g., rainfall, temperature). Our method estimates the returns to all types of
assets, but ultimately we are only interested in those that are targetable.
The minimum data necessary to create a targeting map are a nationally representative
household survey and a census taken at about the same time. In the first step of our analysis, we
compare the data available in the household survey and the census to generate a set of variables
that are common to both data sets, such as demographic variables, livestock holdings and durable
goods. We restrict the data in this way because we must use a regression specification for the
survey data that is replicable in the census for all independent variables. Additional
environmental or public good variables can and should be added when available to supplement
both the survey and census data.
The second step is to use the survey data to estimate the relationship between household
welfare and asset holdings, which include the variables selected in the first step as well as
relevant environmental and public good variables. We assume that household welfare is a
function of asset holdings and location-specific asset returns. 6 We remain agnostic about the
functional form of the asset returns equations and model the relationship between welfare and
asset holdings using a second order flexible functional form. For household i in location c, we
can write the general model as:

ln wic = Aic ' R A ( Aic , Ac , Bc , Yic , Z c ) + Bc ' RB ( Aic , Bc , Yic , Z c )
+ Yic ' RY ( Aic , Bc , Yic , Yc , Z c ) + Z c ' RZ ( Aic , Bc , Yic , Z c ) + δ ' X ic + ε ic

(1)

where wic = household welfare
Aic = private, targetable assets
Ac = location - specific means of Aic
Bc = public, targetable assets

7

Yic = private, non - targetable assets
Yc = location - specific means of Yic
Z c = public, non - targetable assets
X ic = additional controls6
R j (•) is a vector of returns to asset type j = A, B, Y, Z and is the object of estimation. The
functional form of asset returns allows the expected returns to each asset to depend on the stock
6

This specification can be thought of as permanent or structural income (Carter and May 2001, Adato et al. 2006,
Naschold and Barrett forthcoming).
7

The place specific means, Ac and Yc , are derived from the census, eliminating sampling error.
7

of every other asset. For example, the returns to a head of cattle may depend on the household
head’s level of education, the average number of cattle owned in that region, the existence of a
nearby livestock market and/or local precipitation levels. Place-specific asset means are only
interacted with household levels of the same variable (i.e., average cattle holding is interacted
with each household’s cattle holdings, but not with each household’s pig holdings or mobile
phone ownership). Further, we assume the error term is composed of a location component and a
household-specific component:

ε ic = ηc (M c ) + µic = γ ' M c + µic

(2)

where M c = [ Ac , Bc , Yc , Z c ] .
Our principal goal in this second step in constructing the targeting map is to accurately
estimate the coefficients in the welfare-asset relationship. With all interactions included in
Equation (1), the specification will include more than N(N+3)/2 right-hand-side variables, where
N is the combined number of assets in A, B, Y, and Z. With so many variables, the likelihood of a
spurious relationship is high, which would adversely affect the out-of-sample prediction.
With that in mind, we use stepwise iterative deletion (with a threshold p-value of 0.05) to
drop variables from the specification. 8 This in turn can lead to other problems, specifically an
important variable for an asset return function or potentially even an entire asset function could
be deleted erroneously based on randomness. To alleviate this concern, we bootstrap the whole
process 200 times. For each of the 200 iterations, we bootstrap the sample of households from
the survey and then estimate Equation (1) using stepwise iterative deletion. 9 The regression uses
weighted least squares (weighted by population expansion factors) with errors clustered at the
enumeration area level.
Having thus estimated the shape of asset returns, in the third step we project the estimated
coefficients from the first stage regressions onto the census data. Ultimately, however, we are not
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This practice is common in poverty mapping (Okwi et al. 2006, Emwanu et al. 2007, Demombynes et al. 2007).
Poverty mapping methods often partition the data into the smallest regions for which the survey data are
statistically representative and run regressions for each of those regions separately. For example, Okwi et al. (2006)
and Emwanu et al. (2007) split Ugandan data into nine strata and Demombynes and Ozler (2005) split South Africa
into nine provinces. The idea behind this step is to allow coefficient estimates to vary over space. In contrast, we
pool all survey data into a single regression. While in our method coefficient estimates themselves do not vary over
space, asset returns can vary via the large number of place-specific interaction terms. Our motivation for this choice
is to explicitly take into account the influence of place-specific characteristics on asset returns. If in contrast the
geographic scope of regressions was limited, the variation in some variables, especially the place-specific variables
such as climate, would necessarily also be very limited leading to biased and inconsistent parameter estimates.

9
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interested in the coefficient point estimates, but in the expected marginal household-level return
for a given targetable asset, k:

∂E[ln wic ]
∂Rˆ (•)
∂Rˆ (•)
∂Rˆ (•)
∂Rˆ (•)
= Aic ' A + Bc ' B
+ Yic ' Y
+ Zc ' Z
∂Aick
∂Aick
∂Aick
∂Aick
∂Aick

(3)

For each iteration of the bootstrap, we project the coefficient estimates onto the census data and
calculate the derivatives for all targetable assets. 10 Combining iterations, we calculate the mean
estimated marginal return for each household.
We then aggregate households over geographically defined areas and calculate statistics
fundamental to the final product. First, we compute the mean and standard error of the expected
marginal benefits for every geographic area and determine which areas have average marginal
benefits (AMB) that are statistically significantly greater than zero (at the 5% level). 11 The
estimated average marginal returns and their statistical significance inform essential questions
about the expected magnitude of average benefits associated with specific asset transfers in
particular areas. Second, we calculate the proportion of households with positive expected
marginal returns for every geographic area, which reflects the scope of benefits from specific
asset transfers in particular areas.
Finally, using GIS, we generate maps that display and enhance the results. Unlike with
poverty mapping, no one map can summarize all of the results. This product requires a series of
maps. One map can display the most beneficial asset, as judged either by the highest expected
average marginal returns of any asset or the highest proportion of positive expected marginal
returns of any asset, for each geographic area. This map would address question one above: for a
given region, which asset building activity will have the largest marginal gross benefit? Then,
maps can be made for each asset, showing either the expected average marginal returns or the
proportion of households with positive expected marginal returns to that asset for each
geographic area. These maps would address question two above: for a given type of asset
10

Elbers et al. (2003) use a complex simulation procedure to account for the effect of the distribution of residuals on
the poverty estimates. Because our focus is the derivative of Equation (1), our method departs with theirs in this
respect. We still model the error, as shown in Equation 2, to accurately control for covariates.
11
The most common way to estimate the error surrounding the poverty estimates is to use parametric bootstrapping
(Elbers et al. 2003, Demombynes et al. 2007). Parametric bootstrapping projects coefficient estimates onto census
households by taking random draws from the distribution defined by a single set of regression coefficient estimates
and their associated covariance matrix. The poverty statuses of individual households are then averaged by
geographic areas. This process is repeated many times to obtain a distribution of each area’s poverty. We choose
instead to bootstrap the first stage estimation in order to reduce bias in the estimates, since our method puts a greater
premium on the regression coefficient estimates themselves.
9

building activity, in which regions are the marginal gross benefits to such an investment highest?
Two estimated objects, two broad targeting questions, and many assets make for a large number
of maps, each catering to a different audience or targeting question. Combined with poverty
maps that are naturally generated in the third step, one then has a powerful, visual set of tools for
informing the geographic targeting of asset-based poverty reduction interventions. 12

2.1. Methodological Concerns
There are unavoidable shortcomings to this approach. First, this is a partial equilibrium
analysis that cannot account for general equilibrium effects. Substantial, large-scale asset
transfers could affect prices, in which case the estimated marginal benefits would be inaccurate.
For example, if too many cattle were transferred into an area, the market price of milk might
decline and the benefits of owning a cow become less than estimated. However, this could go
both ways, as substantial asset transfers could also lead to positive externalities, as would likely
be the case with mobile phones or transportation infrastructure or any private asset characterized
by (positive) network or technological externalities. We assume that aggregate asset transfers
will typically be marginal in magnitude and therefore that partial equilibrium assumptions
suffice.
In the introduction, we began to discuss endogeneity concerns. The first such concern is
the dual causality between welfare and assets. Does an asset increase a household’s welfare or
does an increase in welfare cause a household to invest in an asset? Clearly both are plausible,
and we cannot separate the two effects.
The second source of endogeneity bias comes from unobserved heterogeneity. Current
asset holdings are not randomly distributed; households choose them based in part on
information not available to the policy analyst. Households that perceive large returns to an asset
due to such unobservables will invest in that asset, while low return households will not. This
will likely bias our estimates of marginal returns upwards. However, this bias is attenuated when
households face constraints on their investment patterns (i.e., credit and savings constraints,
missing markets for desired assets), as is often the case in low-income countries.

12

If poverty estimates generated using a traditional poverty map method are preferred, one could just as easily
combine our marginal benefit estimates with those separately estimated poverty rates.
10

Additional bias could arise due to using imperfect proxies for welfare as the dependent
variable. In our illustrative application, we use expenditure to proxy for welfare. This is the best
available choice in the Uganda data, as in many other instances. But it is still incomplete,
especially when thinking about asset investments. Some assets are acquired not because they will
produce more current expenditure, but because they enhance welfare in some other way or at
some future date. For example, some livestock may be held for risk prevention or social status.
Further, expenditure can be correlated with asset holdings either positively (one must spend to
acquire assets) or negatively (selling assets generates income which increases expenditure).
Collectively, these concerns imply that the cardinality of estimates could be biased,
which would affect inter-asset comparisons and cost-benefit analysis. Unfortunately, we are
unable to estimate the magnitude of the bias using only cross-sectional, observational data, and
thus do not know the extent or magnitude of these effects. But at the very least, our estimates
have ordinal significance for comparing the benefits of a single asset across regions. This in itself
would have operational value as there exist aid organizations and government ministries that deal
in only one asset and have to make intervention siting decisions routinely.
To summarize this sub-section, we deem it important to call attention to the unavoidable
shortcomings of the targeting maps method. But we caution against throwing the policy analysis
baby out with the statistically imperfect bathwater. We are confident that this method generates
meaningful information to help fill an important void that currently plagues development
policymaking and programming. Interventions today are typically planned in the absence of any
empirical estimates of marginal benefits that permit comparison across space or transfer forms.
Despite our method’s admitted imperfections, it is a substantial improvement over the status quo.

3. Data
We apply our method using the 2002 Ugandan National Household Survey, the 2002
Ugandan Population and Housing Census and the 2002 Ugandan Community Survey, all
administered by the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics (UBOS). The household survey and census are
stratified by four regions (Central, East, North, and West) and an urban-rural split. For the
purposes of this paper, we restrict our attention to rural households only (5,648 households in the
survey and nearly 4.4 million in the census), due to their greater reliance on natural capital and
the greater likelihood of spatially heterogeneous asset returns. The hierarchy for Ugandan
11

administrative units, from largest to smallest, is nation, district, county, sub-county, and parish. 13
Parishes contain less than 1,000 households on average and are roughly one-fifth the population
of a sub-county. There are one or two enumeration areas (EA) per parish. The household survey
clustered observations at the EA level and randomly sampled (usually) ten households within the
EA.
We use per adult male equivalent expenditure as our key measure of welfare. The private
asset variables come from the household survey and the census. 14 We use the census, the
community survey and several GIS layers to create location specific public asset variables. 15
From the census, we calculate measures of population density and ethnic diversity, as well as
average asset holdings at the parish level. The community survey includes information on roads,
market access and microfinance access. In addition, we use GIS to derive variables such as
average distance to urban areas, average distance to freshwater and average annual rainfall and
temperature, among others. Data layers for urban areas and water locations were provided by the
International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI). Weather data were downloaded from
www.worldclim.org at a resolution of 30 arc-seconds. These geographic variables are aggregated
at the sub-county level, due to limitations with the GIS software. 16 Table 1 lists each asset
variable used in the analysis, gives summary statistics for each from the survey sample and
census, and defines the variables, if warranted. Cattle and chicken are the most common
livestock held. Human capital is low with, on average, five years of education for the household
head and less than half of the household literate. Mobile phone ownership stands at just three
percent; as a result, estimates of the marginal returns to phones are likely to be inapplicable to
current Uganda, given rapid mobile phone uptake in the intervening period. The statistical
support is sufficiently similar for the two datasets, supporting our out-of-sample prediction.

13

Table 1 in the online appendix lists how many administrative units of each type exist and the average and median
number of households in each unit, for the rural areas of Uganda.
14
As stated above, we are constrained to only use variables that appear in both the census and the survey. There are
several instances where potentially informative variables (e.g., mosquito net coverage of all household members)
could not be included due to this limitation. This underscores the importance of planning and coordinating between
household surveys and censuses.
15
Due to the incomplete coverage of the Community Survey at the parish level, these variables are aggregated to
both the parish and sub-county level, and the sub-county value is joined with the household data when the parish
value is unavailable.
16
Due to the small area of some of the parishes and the relatively larger size of the weather raster data, the zonal
statistics could not be calculated for all parishes.
12

Table 2 in the online appendix lists all of the additional variables used as controls (i.e., the matrix
X in Equation (1)).
In addition to the numerical comparability of the data, geographic comparability is
important. The online appendix gives statistics and maps illustrating that the survey data is
spatially well dispersed and provides excellent geographic coverage. Thus, we have confidence
that our first stage estimates effectively represent many different geographies.

4. Results
As a first step in analyzing the results, we determine the appropriate level of aggregation
for the expected marginal returns. In standard poverty mapping exercises, there is a tradeoff
between geographic aggregation and precision (Elbers et al. 2003). The goal is to aggregate
households into the smallest possible geographic area without sacrificing precision, which
enables inter-regional comparison.
We aggregate derivatives and calculate mean marginal benefits and standard deviation of
benefits for all targetable assets at three different administrative levels: county, sub-county, and
parish. Table 2 gives the estimated mean standard deviations for each targetable asset. Clearly, as
the area of aggregation grows so does the standard deviation. This finding contrasts with the
standard inverse relationship found in poverty mapping due to the difference in our method,
which first estimates household level marginal returns via simulation and then aggregates over
geographic areas. Our estimates are a composite of ordinary imprecision plus inter-household
variation. As the geographic scale grows, more inter-household heterogeneity is introduced and
the standard deviation increases. The empirical findings unequivocally indicate that parish is the
appropriate level of aggregation for our estimates.
Relevant summary statistics for estimated marginal benefits are presented in Table 3. In
addition to the targetable assets, Table 3 presets statistics for the non-targetable asset household
head years of education for purposes of comparison. The table begins by presenting national
averages and then presents results related to between- and within-parish heterogeneity. Column 1
gives the mean of the estimated average marginal benefit (AMB) for all rural parishes. The
magnitudes of estimated AMB seem reasonable. For example, motorized vehicles are more than
eight times as valuable as bicycles, and livestock generally offer low returns. However, the AMB
estimates of mobile phones seems inflated, which is likely a result of the fact that at the time of
13

the survey and census mobile phones were a scarcely owned asset and thus likely a luxury good,
biasing the estimated benefits of ownership upward. In addition, several assets (goats, pigs,
microfinance and road access) have mean returns less than zero. Column 2 gives the proportion
of parishes with AMB greater than zero. These results tend to mirror the AMB in Column 1 in
that assets with large average returns tend to offer positive returns in many parishes. While
negative returns are counterintuitive, we attribute them to imprecise point estimates and
substantial between-parish heterogeneity. Column 3 gives the standard deviation of AMB
(between parishes), which is frequently as large or larger than mean AMB. For instance, the
standard deviation of AMB across space of goats is 15 times larger than the mean. It is standard
to view such large variation as undesirable, but we view this spatial variance positively and think
it underscores the value of this work. Microfinance access stands out as having negative
estimated returns and relatively little variation across space; this is likely a function of selection
bias since microfinance services are frequently targeted to poor areas.
Columns 4 through 6 of Table 3 examine the extent and importance of within-parish
heterogeneity. As discussed above with respect to Table 2, we have an estimate of the standard
deviation of estimated marginal benefits across households for each parish. We can then
categorize an asset as having statistically significantly greater than zero AMB. While this is an
abuse of standard statistical language, it captures well the idea that policy makers may be most
interested in targeting areas with consistently large returns. Column 4 gives the proportions of
parishes with statistically significant AMB for each asset. There tends to be a strong correlation
between the proportion of positive returns the proportion of significant returns. The returns to
literacy are an outlier in this respect, as 92% of parishes have positive AMB, but only 0.3% have
significant returns, which suggest substantial within-parish heterogeneity. This implies that a
geographically targeted literacy program may be inefficient. Column 5 gives the mean of the
estimated AMB conditional on the AMB being statistically significantly greater than zero. It is
these numbers that are indicative of the possible returns that could be achieved within-parish
heterogeneity is additionally used as a condition for a geographically targeted asset transfer
scheme. Column 6 offers an additional measure of within-parish heterogeneity that may be
useful for practitioners. It gives the mean of the proportion of households in each parish with
expected marginal benefits greater than zero. Again, there tends to be a correlation between this
and the other measures of estimated benefits. This statistic captures the scope of benefits, as well
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as the probability of inefficient allocation of an asset. Given the substantial within-parish
heterogeneity, Column 6 additionally points to the value of using multiple targeting tools to
improve efficacy.
Statistics can only give a sense of the results’ value. The more interesting results are the
spatial distribution, heterogeneity and patterns of the estimated benefits. Figure 1 plots the
estimated average marginal returns that are statistically significantly greater than zero for cattle,
chickens, bicycles, and road access at the parish level. We see pockets of high returns, like those
in the northwestern Uganda for cattle, as well as clear spatial patterns, such as the graded decline
of marginal benefits to bicycles as one moves further interior from the Northeast border. For
each asset, a considerable portion of the country does not exhibit statistically significant
estimated returns, reflecting both relatively large standard errors and several negative point
estimates. It is reasonable that some returns are actually negative because we estimate marginal
returns comprehensively, including areas that are completely unsuitable for certain assets. 17
While only 11% of parishes exhibit statistically significant estimated returns for road access, we
see that those significant returns are clustered in the South-central and Southern part of the
country, Uganda’s most urbanized parts.
Figure 2 plots the proportion of households with estimated marginal returns greater than
zero for cattle, chickens, bicycles, and road access. The maps mostly reinforce the information
displayed in Figure 1. Areas with high significant returns also have a large proportion of
households with positive expected returns (e.g., cattle in the northwest). While the nearmonochromatic map for bicycles offers little information in terms of geographic targeting, it
suggests that outside of the urban areas in South-central Uganda, positive marginal benefits are
near universal.
Next, we identify which asset offers the largest estimated benefits for each parish and
map the results in Figure 3. Motor vehicles and mobile phones dominate these maps, which is
not surprising given the large value and expense of motor vehicles and the scarcity and luxury
status of mobile phones at the time these data were collected. However, preferred asset maps can
be created with any set of assets desired, excluding those that are infeasible (e.g., due to expense)
or about which there exists doubt as to the validity of the estimates. To this end, we also generate
maps of the assets with maximum returns, limited to livestock assets only, in the bottom panel of
17

Fan and Chan-Kang 2004 and Kam et al. (2005) also find negative estimated returns to assets in some areas.
15

Figure 3. Cattle, goats and chickens all have substantial presence on these maps indicating that
each species is valuable, but differentially across space, resulting in geographically
heterogeneous preferences.
Beyond looking at the spatial distribution of estimated marginal benefits of an asset, we
examine how those benefits relate to existing holdings of that asset and to the poverty headcount
rate by parish. 18 The first two columns of Table 4 give the correlations of AMB conditional on
significance and the proportion of households with positive marginal returns with mean asset
holdings. A negative correlation between benefits and holdings suggests untapped potential,
perhaps indicating the presence of a market failure. If positive, on the other hand, then asset
investments are already in line with returns, but further investments could still improve welfare.
The results suggest that goats, chickens, and motorized vehicles may be difficult for households
to procure in areas of high estimated returns. On the other hand, the results for mobile phones,
literacy, and road access suggest the presence of positive network externalities.
The second set of columns in Table 4 examines how the estimated returns correlate with
poverty, which is particularly relevant for designing the distribution of aid as it reveals
prospective tradeoffs and synergies between the objectives of efficiency (i.e., maximizing total
expected benefits) and equity (i.e., targeting the poor). The results indicate that poverty reduction
and efficiency goals align for the assets cattle, motorized vehicles, and bicycles, whereas there
may be a tradeoff between equity and efficiency for the assets goats, pigs, chicken, and road
access. To reiterate what was discussed in the introduction, we are not implying that our methods
can judge which assets are best for use in a targeting program. Ultimately it is the policy makers
that must decide which assets are best and which tradeoffs between equity and efficiency they
are willing or unwilling to make. We are merely hoping to provide tools and empirical estimates
that will enable an informed decision.
The analysis thus far has centered on estimated marginal gross returns; information about
the costs of supplying different assets has been conspicuously absent. In order to address this
deficiency and to enable explicit benefit-cost comparisons (albeit simplistically and
18

The poverty headcount rate is the percentage of the population that is poor. In Uganda, a household is deemed
poor if their estimated monthly expenditure falls below the expenditure thresholds set by Emwanu et al. (2007). As a
check on our method, we compare our poverty estimates to those previously estimated for Uganda using the same
data from Emwanu et al. (2007), who estimated the poverty headcount rate at the sub-county level. The correlation
between the two estimated poverty headcount rates is 0.85; the rank correlation is 0.83. The poverty map created
using our method is shown in Figure 2 of the online appendix.
16

incompletely), we compare estimated benefits with actual costs for all livestock assets. 19 Costs
are based on the mean price of livestock purchased or sold, as reported in the household survey
(costs of other assets are unavailable in the data). The cost data do not include the marginal costs
of maintaining stocks; total costs of acquiring and holding an animal would be higher. Because
we are unsure over what time horizon the stream of benefits would accrue and what discount rate
is appropriate, we report only the expected increase in expenditure for a single month. Table 5
presents the findings.
While crude and simplistic, our approach underscores the considerable marginal returns
to investment in rural Uganda. Although only pigs pass a cost-benefit comparison outright, the
other livestock assets would surely pass if the timeframe was extended in accordance with an
animal’s expected lifespan. For instance, chicken would pass with a time horizon of three
months, and cattle would pass for time horizons of 6.7 years, just two years in areas with
expected returns on the high end of the distribution. 20
While detailed exploration of the behavioral and institutional reasons for these findings is
beyond the scope of this methodological paper, the results clearly underscore apparent
underinvestment in productive assets in rural Uganda. Targeting maps of this sort can help
development agencies identify best bet forms for asset transfers in a specific area, given such
apparent underinvestment. Such targeting maps are perhaps especially useful for geographic
targeting of a specific asset transfer program (e.g., livestock or bicycles), since the costs of
provision typically vary only modestly across space for a given asset.
As the final step in illustrating the potential utility of targeting maps, we detail a
hypothetical chicken transfer program. We choose chickens because they are inexpensive, do
relatively well in the cost-benefit comparison and one can easily imagine a development agency
implementing such a scheme. We select candidate parishes based on the following three criteria:
1) expected AMB greater than 0.005 and statistically significant, 2) at least 80% of households
have positive expected marginal benefit to chickens, and 3) a poverty headcount rate greater than
50%. A total of 58 parishes meet these criteria and are mapped in Figure 4. Of those, we
highlight two parishes that show particular promise for this sort of development intervention,
Itojo parish in the southwest and Ating parish in the northeast, based on high levels of both
19

The expected household marginal benefit was calculated using the approximation for log-linear models that a
marginal return of β would increase the household’s expenditure by β%.
20
These calculations assumed a 5% annual discount rate.
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expected returns and poverty. This sort of simple – and very useful –geographic targeting
guidance can be easily repeated for any asset included in the estimation, as well as different
criteria for selection.
Having now presented the results, we now compare our results using recent empirical
research on road access in Uganda. Raballand et al. (2009) examine the roads investment
strategy and find that the goal of extending road access to within 2 km of every household is
misguided and that larger gains exist in improving and maintaining existing roads. Lall et al.
(2009) estimate a locational choice model for industry and find strong agglomeration forces that
suggest investment in rural infrastructure is unlikely to benefit the rural poor in terms of job
creation. Our results are consistent with these findings. Figures 1 and 2 and the correlations in
Table 4 indicate that the benefits to additional road investments are largest primarily surrounding
urban areas. 21 Given the differences in methods and data between our work and that of Raballand
et al. (2009) and Lall et al. (2009), the consistency in results suggests that our method generates
sensible results. We found no other comparable empirical studies of spatial distribution of returns
in Uganda against which we could compare our results.

5. Conclusions
This paper presents a novel method that has the potential to enhance the efficacy of
geographically targeted asset transfer schemes. We add to the substantial literature on small area
estimation, moving beyond estimating poverty so as to begin to identify the best means of
alleviating it. Development agencies and government ministries need to know not only where the
poor reside, but also what forms of transfers are most likely to help move them out of poverty.
Our method first estimates the marginal returns to various assets and then creates a series of
maps that can address a variety of questions regarding the magnitude and scope of benefits and
the efficient spatial allocation of development programs. The results produced using Ugandan
data are promising; estimated and projected asset returns seem reasonable and show substantial
variation across space. When combined with a simultaneously generated poverty map, a
potentially powerful geographic targeting tool emerges.

21

Figure 3 in the online appendix visually explores the relationship between population density and marginal returns
to road access using maps and finds similar results.
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While the maps and other results produced in this paper serve mainly to demonstrate the
potential usefulness of this method, our hope is that the method can be eventually implemented
in development programming. We envision targeting maps being part of a suite of tools,
complementing local knowledge and the well-established use of poverty maps, that policy
makers employ to design asset transfers in low-income countries. The results presented highlight
the possibility that policy makers may face tradeoffs between equity and efficiency, that is
targeting the areas most in need versus the areas with the largest returns. Our results illustrate
how these goals can be balanced, but importantly these tools are flexible and targeting maps can
be designed with specific needs in mind.
Continued work with additional inputs is needed to complement targeting maps. First,
even if a policy maker has a targeting map in hand, there are still unanswered questions about the
net benefits to and final effects of various asset transfers. We addressed some of these concerns
with a limited benefit-cost analysis. A more thorough analysis for all assets with more precise
information on procurement and maintenance costs, as well as asset lifespan, is a natural and
straightforward exercise for agencies intending to implement a transfer scheme using targeting
maps as an input.
Second, targeting maps are not an end in themselves. They estimate marginal returns,
which is only an intermediate step to an end goal of poverty reduction. A natural extension of the
targeting maps method is to use panel data to determining the expected impacts of an asset
transfer program on poverty (or on other outcome variables of interest). Further, optimization
algorithms could be constructed to maximize expected poverty reduction given a fixed budget
and spatial constraints to transfers (e.g., due to logistical concerns). Lastly, we hope that the
promise of these methods might also help encourage organizers of household surveys and
censuses to better coordinate future questionnaires with poverty maps and targeting maps in
mind.
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Tables
Table 1: Summary statistics of all asset variables for rural Uganda
Number of households
Monthly household expenditure (Ugandan Shilling)

Survey
5648
118147

Census
4376978
-

Private, Targetable assets
Cattle (head)
Goats (head)
Pigs (head)
Chicken (head)
Land ownership (1=yes)
Motor vehicle ownership (1=yes)
Bicycle ownership (1=yes)
Mobile phone ownership (1=yes)
Proportion of household literate

Mean
1.74
0.33
0.09
1.87
0.29
0.04
0.47
0.03
0.46

St.
dev.
12.61
3.76
1.15
24.75
0.45
0.19
0.50
0.16
0.29

Mean
1.19
1.00
0.15
2.37
0.16
0.03
0.35
0.03
0.45

St.
dev.
12.49
7.22
1.24
16.93
0.36
0.17
0.48
0.16
0.32

Public, Targetable Assets
Microfinance access (1=yes)
Road access index

0.79
1.09

0.41
0.28

0.79
1.11

0.41
0.30

Private, Non-targetable assets
Household head education (years)

5.06

3.74

4.55

3.85

289.2
0.28
0.57
15.7
1.98
21.83
1227.5
34.1

454.2
0.26
0.50
10.8
3.58
2.01
181.6
15.4

396.9
0.29
0.56
16.0
1.85
21.86
1224.5
34.3

875.5
0.27
0.50
11.4
3.16
2.02
182.9
16.1

Public, Non-targetable Assets
Population density (per sq. km)
Ethnic diversity of parish
Existence of market in parish (1=yes)
Average distance to an urban area in parish (km)
Average distance to freshwater in parish (km)
Average annual temperature (°C)
Average annual total precipitation (mm)
Average precipitation in driest month (mm)

Notes: Distance is measured as Euclidean, or straight-line, distance. Motor vehicle ownership equals one if a household
owns either a car or motorcycle. Ethnic diversity is calculated (as in Easterly and Levine 1997) as the probability that
two people of different ethnicity meet if randomly matched. Microfinance access is derived from the Community Survey
and equals one if at least one community within a parish indicated having access to microfinance services. Road access
index is derived from the Community Survey, in which community respondents rate their local roads as 0 = "no roads",
1 = "seasonal roads" and 2 = "all weather roads". Responses are averaged from all communities within a parish to form
the index.
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Table 2: Mean standard errors of estimated average marginal returns at different
levels of geographic aggregation
Asset
Cattle
Goats
Pigs
Chicken
Motorized vehicle
Bicycle
mobile phone
Proportion of household literate
Microfinance access
Road access

County
0.004
0.011
0.072
0.003
0.174
0.043
0.155
0.535
0.070
0.155

Sub-county
0.003
0.009
0.062
0.002
0.153
0.029
0.126
0.531
0.061
0.092

Parish
0.003
0.008
0.052
0.002
0.134
0.022
0.108
0.524
0.053
0.076
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Table 3: Summary statistics for estimated marginal benefits to assets

Asset

Mean AMB

Proportion of
parishes with
positive
AMB

Standard
deviation of
AMB

Proportion of
parishes with
significant
AMB

Mean AMB
conditional on
significance

Mean PROP

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Cattle
0.004
88.0%
0.005
41.4%
0.007
81.5%
Goats
-0.001
50.0%
0.016
17.3%
0.021
49.0%
Pigs
-0.077
9.3%
0.063
0.9%
0.086
15.2%
Chicken
0.000
56.4%
0.003
30.5%
0.003
57.3%
Motorized vehicle
0.522
99.8%
0.241
96.2%
0.536
99.3%
Bicycle
0.063
87.7%
0.064
73.2%
0.086
87.1%
mobile phone
0.401
97.9%
0.148
91.5%
0.422
97.6%
Proportion of household literate
0.203
92.0%
0.172
0.3%
0.923
62.1%
Microfinance access
-0.068
2.0%
0.032
2.3%
Road access
-0.079
32.1%
0.183
11.2%
0.200
33.4%
Head education
0.009
95.6%
0.006
0.1%
0.027
66.1%
Notes: AMB stands for average marginal benefit and PROP stands for proportion of households with expected positive marginal
benefits. “-” indicates a missing value.
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Table 4: Correlation of estimated average marginal benefits that are significantly greater than zero and proportion of households
receiving a positive expected benefit with average asset holdings and the poverty rate
Asset holdings
Asset
Cattle
Goats
Pigs
Chicken
Motorized vehicle
Bicycle
mobile phone
Proportion of household literate
Microfinance access
Road access

Average significant
benefit
-0.02*
-0.12*
0.6*
-0.04*
-0.36*
-0.21*
0.29*
0.01*
0.39*

Proportion positive
benefit
0.06*
-0.2*
-0.16*
-0.24*
-0.57*
0.15*
0.06*
0.94*
-0.1*
0.74*

Poverty rate
Average significant
benefit
0.05*
-0.04
-0.37*
-0.04*
0.24*
0.04
-0.1
0.25*
-0.24*

Proportion positive
benefit
0.2*
-0.59*
-0.37*
-0.01*
0.11*
0.25*
0.08*
-0.8*
0.11*
-0.36*

Notes: * indicates significance at 5% level. “-” indicates a missing value.
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Table 5: Simplified cost-benefit analysis
Asset
Cattle
Chicken
Goats
Pigs

Cost
214,112
3,308
16,301
19,788

Expected marginal monthly benefit
Median
3,074
1,216
10,200
43,631

95th percentile
8,851
2,864
18,490
78,401

Notes: All numbers are in Ugandan Shillings. Expected benefits are only calculated for
parishes that have significantly greater than zero average marginal benefits.
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Figures
Figure 1: Examples of maps of estimated average marginal returns that are significantly greater
than zero for the given asset.
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Figure 2: Examples of maps of proportion of households with estimated positive marginal return
for the given asset.
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Figure 3: Maximum asset returns
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Figure 4: Sample targeting exercise

Notes: Parishes are selected by meeting three criteria: 1) estimated poverty rate greater than 50%, 2) expected AMB
greater than 0.0005, and 3) Proportion of households with expected positive marginal benefits greater than 80%.
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